Legacy Authentication Not Blocked

The tenant does not block legacy authentication, so any service that still accepts a username and password over an older protocol can be signed in to without MFA.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.14.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.06.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-308: Use of Single-factor Authentication
OWASP Top 10A07:2025 Authentication Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1110.003 Password Spraying, T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1114.002 Remote Email Collection
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

Legacy authentication is the term Microsoft Entra ID uses for sign-ins from clients that send a username and password directly, over protocols such as IMAP, POP3, authenticated SMTP, Exchange ActiveSync with basic authentication, and older Office clients. These clients cannot perform multifactor authentication (MFA), so a sign-in that succeeds over one of them is single-factor, whatever MFA policies apply to modern clients. The finding is raised where no Conditional Access policy blocks the legacy client types (Exchange ActiveSync clients and other clients) and security defaults, which would block them, are switched off.

Where any legacy protocol still accepts a password, an attacker can password spray it, or use stolen passwords against it, without meeting an MFA prompt; legacy protocols have long been a favoured route for password spraying precisely because they bypass MFA. A successful sign-in can give access to the user's mailbox, for example by downloading mail over IMAP or sending mail as the user through authenticated SMTP. Microsoft has been retiring basic authentication from Exchange Online, which reduces but does not remove the exposure: the risk depends on which protocols and services in the tenant still accept a password alone, the impact is limited to what those protocols allow, and it is low where basic authentication is already switched off for every protocol the tenant uses.

The weakness is identified by reviewing the Conditional Access policies and security defaults, and by filtering the sign-in logs by client app to show legacy sign-ins, successful and failed. Repeated failures from unfamiliar addresses usually indicate password spraying. Exchange Online settings such as SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled and the per-mailbox POP and IMAP settings show which protocols remain available, and tools such as MFASweep test which endpoints accept a password alone.

Remediation

  • Create a Conditional Access policy that targets all users, excluding only the emergency access accounts, and all resources, with the client apps condition set to Exchange ActiveSync clients and other clients, and the grant control set to block access. Run it in report-only mode first and review which sign-ins it would block.
  • Where the tenant has no Conditional Access licences, enable security defaults, which block legacy authentication.
  • Switch off protocols that are not needed in Exchange Online: disable SMTP AUTH for the organisation and enable it only on mailboxes that need it, and disable POP and IMAP on mailboxes that do not use them. For example, to disable them everywhere before re-enabling the exceptions:
Set-TransportConfig -SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled $true Get-CASMailbox -ResultSize Unlimited | Set-CASMailbox -PopEnabled $false -ImapEnabled $false
  • Move devices and applications that send mail, such as printers and line-of-business systems, to OAuth or to a connector-based relay, and update or replace clients that cannot use modern authentication.

Confirm the fix by filtering the sign-in logs for legacy client apps and finding no successful sign-ins, and by attempting an IMAP or authenticated SMTP sign-in with a test account, expecting it to be refused.

References


Add This Finding to Your Library

In Pental this write-up is in Settings, Library. Add to my library copies it into your own, rated in your firm's CVSS version, ready to put in your own words.

Free trial  ·  No card required

Only need the reporting? Our reporting tool is free and open source, with the same library.


More Azure and Microsoft 365 Findings

Every Azure and Microsoft 365 finding