Missing Binary Exploit Mitigations
Some of the application's binaries are built without exploit mitigations such as ASLR, DEP or Control Flow Guard, making any memory corruption flaw easier to exploit.
| Severity | Informational |
| CVSS 3.1 | 0 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 0 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure |
| OWASP Top 10 | A06:2025 Insecure Design |
| Category | Security Misconfiguration |
Description
One or more of the application's executables or DLLs were built without the exploit mitigations that Windows supports. Each is set at compile or link time: address space layout randomisation (ASLR, the /DYNAMICBASE linker option, with /HIGHENTROPYVA for 64-bit binaries), Data Execution Prevention (DEP, /NXCOMPAT), Control Flow Guard (CFG, /guard:cf), stack buffer security checks (/GS) and, for 32-bit binaries, safe exception handlers (/SAFESEH). Current Microsoft toolchains enable several of these by default, so their absence usually points to an old compiler, another toolchain, options deliberately disabled, or third-party components shipped with the application.
These mitigations do not fix vulnerabilities, and missing mitigations give an attacker nothing on their own; the finding is reported for information. They make memory corruption flaws such as buffer overflows much harder to turn into code execution, so if such a flaw exists or is later found in an affected binary, for example in its handling of a crafted file or network message, the missing mitigations make reliable exploitation, and therefore code execution in the context of the user or service running the application, considerably easier. ASLR applies per module, so a single DLL without it, loaded at a predictable address, can give an attacker the known code locations they need even when every other module is protected.
The issue matters most for native C and C++ components that parse files or network data; managed .NET and Java code is far less exposed, though the native libraries it loads are not. The settings are identified by inspecting each binary's headers, for example with dumpbin /headers or tools such as winchecksec and PESecurity; on Linux, checksec reports the equivalent ELF protections.
Remediation
Rebuild the affected binaries with the platform's exploit mitigations enabled:
- For Microsoft Visual C++, compile with
/GSand/guard:cf, and link with/DYNAMICBASE,/HIGHENTROPYVA(64-bit),/NXCOMPAT,/guard:cfand, for 32-bit builds,/SAFESEH. Remove any options that disable them, such as/DYNAMICBASE:NO. - For other toolchains, use the equivalents, such as position-independent executables, non-executable stacks and full RELRO for GCC and Clang on Linux.
- Ask the suppliers of third-party DLLs for builds with these mitigations, or replace components that cannot be rebuilt.
- Add a check to the build pipeline that fails a release when a binary lacks the required settings.
As an interim measure, Windows Exploit Protection can enforce DEP and mandatory ASLR for the application's processes, configured per application in Windows Security or with the Set-ProcessMitigation cmdlet after testing for compatibility; it cannot add Control Flow Guard to binaries not compiled for it. Confirm the fix by inspecting the headers of every shipped binary.
References
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