MTA-STS Not Configured

The domain publishes no MTA-STS policy, so servers sending it email fall back to unencrypted or unverified delivery if an attacker interferes with the connection.

SeverityInformational
CVSS 3.10 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.00 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-757: Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade')
OWASP Top 10A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

Email between mail servers is protected by STARTTLS, which is opportunistic: a sending server encrypts the connection if the receiving server offers it, and usually does not check the receiving server's certificate. An attacker who can intercept or redirect traffic between the sending and receiving mail servers, for example through a compromised network or provider on the path, or by tampering with DNS answers for the domain's MX records, can remove the STARTTLS offer so that the message is sent in clear text, or present a certificate of their own. Most sending servers will carry on, so the attacker can read or alter inbound email in transit without the sender or recipient noticing.

SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS, RFC 8461) lets a domain tell senders that its mail servers support TLS with valid certificates, so that senders which support MTA-STS refuse to deliver over an unencrypted or unverified connection. Its absence does not expose mail by itself, but removes this protection against an attacker already in such a position, and because that position is hard to obtain, the finding is rated informational, as a recommended hardening measure.

A policy has two parts: a DNS TXT record at _mta-sts under the domain, and a policy file served over HTTPS from the host mta-sts under the domain, at the path /.well-known/mta-sts.txt, listing the permitted MX host names and a mode of testing or enforce. The finding is reported when no policy exists, or when one is left in testing mode, in which senders report failures but still deliver. It is usually paired with SMTP TLS Reporting (TLS-RPT, RFC 8460), a _smtp._tls TXT record that asks senders to report delivery problems. DANE for SMTP (RFC 7672) gives similar protection to domains signed with DNSSEC.

Remediation

Publish an MTA-STS policy, with TLS reporting, for each domain that receives email:

  • Make sure every MX host supports STARTTLS with a certificate from a public certification authority that is valid for the MX host name. Hosted platforms such as Exchange Online and Gmail already meet this for their MX hosts.
  • Publish the policy file at /.well-known/mta-sts.txt on the mta-sts host under the domain, served over HTTPS with a valid certificate, starting in testing mode, for example:
version: STSv1 mode: testing mx: mail.example.com max_age: 86400
  • Publish the two DNS records, changing the id value whenever the policy changes:
_mta-sts.example.com. TXT "v=STSv1; id=1" _smtp._tls.example.com. TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@example.com"
  • Review the TLS reports, then change the mode to enforce, raise max_age to a period of weeks, and change the id.
  • Where the domain is signed with DNSSEC, consider publishing DANE TLSA records for the MX hosts as well, for senders that support DANE.

Confirm the fix by retrieving the policy file and DNS records and checking them with an MTA-STS validation tool, and by checking that the TLS reports show successful sessions.

References


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