Privileged Roles Assigned Permanently

Privileged directory and Azure roles are assigned permanently rather than activated when needed, so the accounts hold administrative rights at all times.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.16.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.07.5 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-272: Least Privilege Violation
MITRE ATT&CKT1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

Administrative roles in Microsoft Entra ID, such as Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator and Exchange Administrator, and privileged Azure roles such as Owner, User Access Administrator and Contributor, can be assigned in two ways. A permanent active assignment gives the account the role's rights at all times. An eligible assignment, managed through Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM), gives no rights until the user activates the role for a limited period, and activation can require multifactor authentication, a justification and approval, and is logged and can raise alerts.

The finding applies where privileged roles are held through permanent active assignments, either because PIM is not licensed (it requires Microsoft Entra ID P2 or Microsoft Entra ID Governance) or because it is licensed but assignments were made, or left, as permanent. Such standing privilege means that anyone who compromises an administrator's password, session cookie or token, for example through adversary-in-the-middle phishing or malware on the administrator's device, immediately holds that administrator's full rights, with no further prompt, approval or alert. With an eligible assignment the attacker would also have to pass the activation requirements, and the activation itself would be recorded and could alert defenders. Standing privilege also widens the window for misuse by the administrators themselves. The impact depends on the roles concerned and is greatest for tenant-wide directory roles and subscription-level Azure roles.

The finding is identified in PIM by reviewing the active assignments for Microsoft Entra roles, Azure resources and groups managed through PIM, and looking for assignments with no end date. Emergency access accounts are a deliberate exception and should be the only permanent holders.

Remediation

  • Licence PIM for the accounts that hold privileged roles, then convert each permanent active assignment to an eligible assignment, for Microsoft Entra roles, Azure resource roles and role-assignable groups.
  • Configure each role's settings: require MFA, or a Conditional Access authentication context, on activation; require a justification; require approval for the most privileged roles; keep the maximum activation duration short; and send notifications when roles are activated.
  • Give eligible assignments an end date where the need is temporary, and review them regularly with access reviews.
  • Remove privileged roles that are not needed at all, rather than making them eligible.
  • Keep two cloud-only emergency access accounts with permanent Global Administrator assignments, excluded from the activation requirements and monitored for any use.

Where PIM cannot be licensed straight away, reduce the number of privileged role holders, require phishing-resistant MFA for administrative roles through Conditional Access, and alert on changes to role assignments. Confirm the fix by reviewing the active assignments in PIM and finding no permanent privileged assignments other than the emergency access accounts.

References


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