Unauthenticated Industrial Protocols Exposed

Industrial control devices accept read, write and control commands over protocols such as Modbus/TCP, DNP3 or S7comm from any host that can reach them, without authentication.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.17.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.08.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
OWASP Top 10A07:2025 Authentication Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation, T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot
CategoryBroken Access Control

Description

Many industrial protocols were designed for closed, trusted networks and have no authentication. Modbus/TCP (TCP 502), DNP3 (TCP 20000), Siemens S7comm (TCP 102), EtherNet/IP with CIP (TCP 44818) and BACnet/IP (UDP 47808), among others, accept commands from any device that can reach them. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs), remote terminal units, protection relays, building management controllers and protocol gateways will act on requests to read process values, write to registers and coils, change setpoints, download or upload control logic, or stop and start the controller, as far as the protocol and device support them.

Secure variants exist, such as DNP3 Secure Authentication, Modbus/TCP Security and CIP Security, as do access protection and password features in many controllers, but installed equipment often does not support them or they are not enabled. An attacker who can reach these services, from the corporate network or wherever else they are exposed, can therefore read process data and, with knowledge of the process, change setpoints, force outputs, alter or replace control logic, or stop controllers, with consequences that extend beyond data: production can be halted, equipment damaged and, in safety-related processes, people or the environment harmed. Safety instrumented systems and physical interlocks may limit the worst outcomes, but should not be relied on as a defence against deliberate manipulation.

Exposure to the internet greatly increases the likelihood of attack, as such services are routinely catalogued by internet-wide scanning. The weakness is identified by scanning for these services and identifying devices with read-only queries, for example with Nmap scripts such as modbus-discover, s7-info, enip-info and bacnet-info, or with dedicated industrial security tools. On live industrial systems, testing is limited to passive or read-only checks agreed with the asset owner, as even well-formed requests can disrupt fragile devices.

Remediation

  • Make these services reachable only from the systems that need them, such as the engineering workstations, HMIs and historians in the same zone, with firewalls between the corporate and OT networks and within the OT network, following a zone and conduit model such as that of IEC 62443. Never expose them to the internet, and provide remote support through a secure remote access solution with multi-factor authentication.
  • Where the devices and protocols support it, enable authentication and integrity protection, such as DNP3 Secure Authentication, CIP Security, Modbus/TCP Security, or the controller's access protection and password features, and use key switches or equivalent controls that block program changes while the controller is running, where available.
  • Use industrial firewalls or protocol-aware gateways that allow only specific function codes, for example read-only Modbus functions from the historian, and permit programming and write commands only from engineering workstations.
  • Monitor OT networks with passive tools that understand industrial protocols, and alert on writes, logic downloads and stop commands from unexpected sources.

As an interim measure, block the industrial protocol ports at the boundary between corporate and OT networks. Confirm the fix by repeating read-only discovery from the corporate network and other untrusted networks and checking that the services can no longer be reached.

References


Add This Finding to Your Library

In Pental this write-up is in Settings, Library. Add to my library copies it into your own, rated in your firm's CVSS version, ready to put in your own words.

Free trial  ·  No card required

Only need the reporting? Our reporting tool is free and open source, with the same library.


More IoT and OT Findings

Every IoT and OT finding