OT Devices Reachable From the Corporate Network

Operational technology such as PLCs, HMIs and engineering workstations can be reached directly from the corporate network, without a controlled boundary between the two.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.18.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.05.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:H Open in the calculator
CWECWE-653: Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization
OWASP Top 10A06:2025 Insecure Design
MITRE ATT&CKT1021 Remote Services, T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
CategoryInsecure Design

Description

Operational technology (OT) networks contain the systems that monitor and control physical processes: programmable logic controllers, human-machine interfaces, engineering workstations, historians, safety systems and building management controllers. Recognised reference models, such as the Purdue model and the zones and conduits of IEC 62443, place a controlled boundary between the corporate (IT) network and OT, usually a demilitarised zone that holds shared systems such as historian replicas and remote access gateways, so that no traffic passes directly between the two.

The weakness is present where systems on the corporate network can connect directly to OT devices, because the networks are routed together without filtering, firewall rules permit broad access, dual-homed computers connect both networks, or remote access tools on OT systems bypass the boundary. An attacker who compromises a corporate system, for example through phishing, can then reach industrial systems directly and attack them with the techniques used against IT systems, or through industrial protocols that often have no authentication, and ransomware and other malware can spread into OT, where systems are often older, harder to patch and slower to recover. The consequences can include loss of view and control of the process, production stoppages, equipment damage and safety incidents.

The likelihood depends on the weaknesses of the OT systems that become reachable, which are frequently significant. The weakness is identified by scanning OT address ranges from user and server networks, with care and the agreement of the asset owner, and finding industrial protocols, remote desktop, VNC, web interfaces or file shares on OT systems that respond.

Remediation

  • Separate OT from the corporate network with a firewall-enforced boundary and an industrial demilitarised zone, so that corporate systems communicate only with systems in the DMZ and nothing routes directly between IT and OT.
  • Allow only documented, necessary flows across the boundary, each with a business reason, preferring connections initiated from the OT side, such as a historian sending data outwards.
  • Provide remote and vendor access through a dedicated, monitored gateway in the DMZ with multi-factor authentication and approval for each session, and remove remote access tools and dual network connections that bypass it.
  • Segment the OT network itself into zones according to function and criticality, as IEC 62443 describes.
  • Monitor traffic crossing the boundary and within OT with tools that understand industrial protocols.
  • Plan for the case where the corporate network is compromised, with the ability to isolate OT quickly while keeping the process running.

As an interim measure, block all traffic from corporate networks to OT ranges except specific, documented flows. Confirm the fix by repeating the scan from corporate networks and checking that no OT systems respond.

References


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