Firmware Updates Not Signed or Verified

A device installs firmware updates without checking a cryptographic signature, so anyone able to supply an update can run their own code on it.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.18.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.09.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check
OWASP Top 10A08:2025 Software or Data Integrity Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1601.001 Patch System Image, T1495 Firmware Corruption
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

A firmware update mechanism should confirm, before installing an image, that it was produced by the manufacturer and has not been altered, normally by checking a digital signature against a public key held in protected storage on the device. Where the device accepts any correctly formatted image, or checks only a checksum such as a CRC or an unkeyed hash supplied with the image, anyone who can deliver an image can install firmware of their choice. That gives complete and persistent control of the device that survives reboots and factory resets, which can be used to steal the data and credentials it handles, to change what it does, to attack other systems from a trusted position, or to make it permanently unusable.

Updates reach devices in several ways, each with its own exposure: an image uploaded through the device's web or management interface, an image fetched automatically from the manufacturer over an unencrypted or unauthenticated connection, an update pushed by a management platform, or an image loaded from removable media or a service port. The attacker's route for delivering an image, whether through an exposed management interface, by intercepting the device's update traffic or with brief physical access, determines how easily this can be done, and where many devices share an update channel, one compromise of that channel can affect all of them.

The weakness is identified by obtaining a genuine image, modifying it, for example by changing a file in its file system after unpacking it with tools such as binwalk, recalculating any checksums, and observing whether the device accepts it, or by intercepting the automatic update process. Reviewing the update code in the firmware can also show whether a signature is checked at all, and whether older, vulnerable images can be installed in place of newer ones.

Remediation

  • Sign every firmware image with a private key kept in a hardware security module or an equivalent protected signing service, and verify the signature on the device before any part of the image is written, using a public key held in read-only or otherwise protected memory.
  • Anchor the check in a secure boot chain, so that the bootloader also verifies the firmware at every start-up and a modified image cannot run even if it is written by another route.
  • Deliver updates over an authenticated, encrypted channel, such as TLS with certificate validation, while relying on the signature rather than the channel for integrity.
  • Prevent rollback to older, vulnerable versions with a version counter that the update process enforces.
  • Restrict who can trigger updates: require authenticated administrative access to update interfaces, and keep those interfaces off untrusted networks.

Where the devices are bought rather than built, raise the issue with the manufacturer and ask for signed updates. As an interim measure, restrict network access to the devices' management interfaces, obtain updates only from the manufacturer's official source over HTTPS, and check any published hash before installing. Confirm the fix by attempting to install a modified image again and checking that the device rejects it.

References


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