Access Badges Can Be Cloned

Staff access cards use low-frequency proximity technology that transmits a fixed number without authentication, so cards can be read covertly and cloned.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.16.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.07 CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
OWASP Top 10A07:2025 Authentication Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1200 Hardware Additions
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

The organisation's access control system uses 125 kHz low-frequency proximity cards, such as HID Prox, EM4100-family or Indala cards. These cards transmit a fixed identifier whenever a reader powers them, with no encryption and no challenge-response authentication, so the reader has no way to tell a genuine card from a copy. Some legacy high-frequency cards, such as MIFARE Classic and older HID iCLASS cards using the standard keys, rely on broken or publicly known cryptography and have the same practical weakness.

An attacker can read a card from a short distance with a handheld device such as a Proxmark3, or from further away with a concealed long-range reader, for example while standing next to the card holder in a queue or lift, then write the identifier to a blank writable card or emulate it. The reader accepts the copy with no indication that it is not genuine, so the attacker gains the same physical access as the holder, without forcing entry or relying on tailgating, and can return repeatedly; cloning the card of a facilities, IT or security staff member can give access to server rooms and other sensitive areas. Use of the clone is logged under the genuine holder's name, which hinders detection and investigation. The attack requires physical proximity to a card holder, which limits the rating.

The weakness is identified by reviewing the card technology in use, reading a test card supplied by the organisation, cloning it, and confirming that readers accept the clone. Multi-technology readers deserve particular attention, because they often continue to accept the old low-frequency cards after more secure cards have been issued.

Remediation

Replace the card technology, and add a second factor where the risk justifies it:

  • Migrate to cards that use mutual cryptographic authentication with keys diversified per card, such as MIFARE DESFire EV2 or EV3, or HID Seos or iCLASS SE, with keys managed by the organisation or its installer under a documented process rather than left at default values.
  • Once all cards are replaced, reconfigure multi-technology readers to reject the old low-frequency format, and check that no reader still accepts it.
  • Require a PIN or biometric in addition to the card at entrances to sensitive areas, such as server and equipment rooms.
  • Configure the access control system to alert on anomalies, such as the same card used at distant doors within a short time, or out-of-hours use.
  • As a short-term measure, issue shielded card sleeves, and advise staff not to wear badges visibly outside the premises.

Confirm the fix by attempting to read and clone a card of the new type, and confirming that readers reject the copy.

References


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