Users Submitted Credentials to a Phishing Page

During a phishing exercise, users entered their credentials into a fake sign-in page, and the authentication in use could not stop those credentials being reused.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.18.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.08.5 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-1390: Weak Authentication
OWASP Top 10A07:2025 Authentication Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1598.003 Spearphishing Link, T1078 Valid Accounts
CategoryInsecure Design

Description

During a simulated phishing campaign, a number of recipients followed a link in an email and entered their usernames and passwords, and in some cases multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes, into a sign-in page controlled by the tester. The page imitated a service the organisation uses, such as Microsoft 365, and the emails used pretexts typical of real attacks, such as a shared document, a parcel delivery or a security alert. An attacker who obtains valid credentials in this way can sign in as those users to email, file storage and other internet-facing services, read and send mail as them, and use their access to send further phishing internally, commit payment fraud, or gain a foothold for wider compromise. The attack requires a user to act, but needs no prior access.

A successful credential phish shows that several layers did not stop the attack: email filtering delivered the message, web filtering allowed the page, recipients did not recognise the warning signs, and the authentication in use could not distinguish the tester from the genuine user. The last point matters most. Passwords alone, and one-time codes or push approvals entered or accepted through a fake page, can be relayed by readily available adversary-in-the-middle phishing kits, which also capture the session cookie issued after sign-in, and where a session cookie or MFA code is relayed in real time, MFA that is not phishing-resistant gives no protection. Only phishing-resistant methods, such as FIDO2 security keys and passkeys, Windows Hello for Business and certificate-based authentication, cannot be relayed through a fake site in this way.

The finding reflects the controls that failed, not the individuals involved. Well-crafted phishing deceives a proportion of users in every organisation, so defences must assume that some submissions will happen.

Remediation

Combine technical, procedural and awareness controls, starting with those that make a submitted password useless:

  • Deploy phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, such as FIDO2 security keys or passkeys, Windows Hello for Business or certificate-based authentication, starting with administrators and staff with access to sensitive data or payments, and enforce it through conditional access.
  • Require sign-ins to come from managed, compliant devices where practical, so that stolen credentials or session cookies cannot be used from an attacker's computer.
  • Strengthen email and web filtering, with link checking at the time of click, blocking of newly registered domains and impersonation protection.
  • Make reporting easy, with a report button in the mail client, and act on reports quickly by removing the message from other mailboxes and blocking the site.
  • Run regular awareness training with realistic exercises that show how to recognise fake sign-in pages, and that praise reporting rather than penalising mistakes.
  • Prepare the response: for affected accounts, reset passwords, revoke sessions and refresh tokens, review mailbox rules and registered MFA methods, and check sign-in logs.

Confirm improvement through follow-up exercises that measure submission and reporting rates, and by verifying that phishing-resistant methods are enforced.

References


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