Users Ran a Payload Delivered by Phishing
During a phishing exercise, users opened a file or link that ran the tester's payload, and email and endpoint controls did not prevent it from running.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 8.4 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-654: Reliance on a Single Factor in a Security Decision |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1204.002 Malicious File |
| Category | Insecure Design |
Description
During a simulated phishing campaign, a number of recipients opened an attachment or followed a link and ran a payload supplied by the tester, which then connected back to the tester's infrastructure. An attacker who achieves the same gains code execution on the user's workstation with that user's privileges, and with it access to the user's files, email and browser sessions, and a foothold on the internal network from which to move laterally, escalate privileges and deploy ransomware; a single successful execution is often enough. The attack requires a user to open the file or link, which is reflected in the rating.
Payloads used in such exercises, as in real attacks, include shortcut (LNK) files, scripts, HTML Application files, disk image and archive files containing executables, installers, documents that abuse trusted features, and files assembled in the browser through HTML smuggling to get past email filtering.
Each successful execution shows that several layers failed together: email or web filtering delivered the file, the endpoint allowed an untrusted file from the internet to run, endpoint protection did not block or contain it, and the user did not recognise the lure. Because only one user needs to run a payload for an attacker to gain a foothold, resilience depends on technical controls that stop execution regardless of the user's decision, rather than on every user making the right choice every time. The finding describes the controls that did not prevent execution, not the individuals involved; convincing lures deceive a proportion of users in every organisation.
Remediation
Prevent untrusted code from running whatever the user does, and support users in spotting and reporting lures:
- Enforce application control, such as App Control for Business or AppLocker, so that only approved software can run, starting by blocking execution from user-writable locations such as Downloads and temporary folders.
- Enable Microsoft Defender attack surface reduction rules, or the equivalent controls in other endpoint products, such as those that block executable content from email and webmail, and Office applications creating child processes.
- Block risky attachment types at the email gateway, including executables, scripts, HTML Application, shortcut, disk image and macro-enabled files.
- Change the default handler for script file types such as
.js,.vbs,.wsfand.hta, so that they open in a text editor rather than running. - Remove local administrator rights from standard users, and make sure endpoint detection and response alerts are monitored and acted on.
- Run regular awareness training and exercises that encourage prompt reporting, and give users a simple report button.
Confirm improvement by repeating the exercise with the same payload types and confirming that they are blocked.
References
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