Staff Disclosed Information or Credentials by Phone

During telephone social engineering, staff disclosed internal information or credentials to an unverified caller posing as a colleague, supplier or IT support.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.15.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.05.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
OWASP Top 10A07:2025 Authentication Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1598.004 Spearphishing Voice, T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice, T1684.001 Impersonation
CategoryInsecure Design

Description

During telephone social engineering (vishing) testing, staff disclosed information or took actions for a caller whose identity they had not verified. Typical pretexts are a member of the IT service desk resolving a fault, a new or remote colleague who cannot reach a system, a senior manager with an urgent request, or a supplier updating its details. Callers often spoof the displayed number to match an internal or known external one, and use details gathered from public sources to sound credible. The attack requires staff interaction but no prior access, and can be repeated against many staff at little cost.

What is disclosed in such tests ranges from internal details useful for later attacks, such as staff names, roles, internal systems, software in use and procedures, which help an attacker craft convincing phishing and further calls and choose targets, to passwords, MFA codes, approval of authentication prompts, or installation of remote support software at the caller's request. The latter give the attacker direct access to accounts or workstations, with the impact of a successful credential phish.

The finding shows that procedures for verifying callers are missing, not widely known, or not practical to follow under pressure, so that a familiar-sounding name, a displayed number or the use of internal terminology was accepted as proof of identity. It reflects the process and awareness controls in place, not the individuals who answered.

Remediation

Give staff a simple, supported way to verify callers, and remove the opportunities a convincing caller can exploit:

  • State clearly, and repeat regularly, that the IT service desk and other staff will never ask for a password or MFA code, or ask a user to approve a prompt they did not start.
  • Introduce a callback procedure: for any request involving credentials, access, payments or personal data, end the call and ring the person back on a number taken from the internal directory or supplier records, never one the caller gives.
  • Configure push-based MFA to use number matching, and move towards phishing-resistant methods, so that codes and approvals cannot be passed to a caller.
  • Restrict remote support tools to approved software started through the service desk's own process.
  • Run awareness training with realistic scenarios, and make it easy and blame-free to report suspicious calls so that others can be warned.

Confirm improvement through a follow-up vishing exercise using similar pretexts.

References


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