Unrestricted Outbound Network Access

Internal systems can open connections to any address and port on the internet, so malware or an attacker can freely set up control channels and send data out.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.14.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.05.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure
OWASP Top 10A06:2025 Insecure Design
MITRE ATT&CKT1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1571 Non-Standard Port, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, T1572 Protocol Tunneling
CategorySecurity Misconfiguration

Description

Egress filtering restricts the connections that internal systems can make to the internet. Where the perimeter firewall allows all outbound traffic, or broad ranges of ports and protocols, any compromised workstation or server can connect directly to any external system on any port, including protocols that should never leave the network, such as SMB, RDP and SSH, DNS sent straight to external resolvers, and arbitrary high ports.

Unrestricted outbound access does not let an attacker in, but it removes a control that can stop or expose an attack after the initial compromise. Malware and intrusion tools can reach their command and control servers on whatever port suits them, data can be sent out directly over many protocols, and outbound SMB or WebDAV connections can disclose users' NTLM credentials to external servers. Servers with internet access can also download tools and be used to attack others, and where the organisation's monitoring relies on traffic passing through a proxy, direct connections bypass it.

The weakness is identified from a workstation or server on the internal network by attempting outbound connections across a wide range of TCP and UDP ports to a system the tester controls on the internet, and recording which succeed. Testing also checks whether web traffic must pass through an authenticating proxy, whether DNS queries can reach external servers directly or only through the organisation's resolvers, and whether servers, which rarely need to browse the web, have the same outbound access as user workstations.

Remediation

  • Change the perimeter firewall policy to deny outbound traffic by default, and allow only the destinations, ports and protocols that are needed, each recorded with an owner and a business reason.
  • Route user web traffic through a proxy or secure web gateway that authenticates users, inspects content and logs requests, and block direct outbound HTTP and HTTPS from user networks.
  • Allow DNS to the internet only from the organisation's own resolvers, and block outbound SMB (TCP 445 and 139), NetBIOS, RDP, SSH and other administrative protocols from all internal networks unless a specific system needs them.
  • Restrict servers more tightly than workstations: most need only specific update and service endpoints, and many need no internet access at all.
  • Log denied outbound connections, and alert on unusual volumes, destinations and ports, which can indicate compromise.

As an interim measure, block the highest-risk outbound protocols, such as SMB and direct DNS, and restrict servers first. Confirm the fix by repeating the outbound port test from user and server networks and checking that only the approved traffic succeeds.

References


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