Users Connected Unknown Removable Media
Users connected removable media of unknown origin, such as USB drives left in or near the premises, to organisational computers and opened files on them.
| Severity | Medium |
| CVSS 3.1 | 6.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 7 CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-654: Reliance on a Single Factor in a Security Decision |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1091 Replication Through Removable Media, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1200 Hardware Additions |
| Category | Insecure Design |
Description
USB storage devices left where staff would find them, such as car parks, reception areas and shared spaces, or sent to staff, were connected to organisational computers and the files on them opened. The devices carried harmless tracking files or payloads that reported back when opened, labelled to invite curiosity, for example as salary information or confidential documents.
Current versions of Windows no longer run programs automatically from USB drives, so the attack relies on the user opening a file, which can be a shortcut, script, document or executable disguised as something else. Devices that look like storage but present themselves to the computer as a keyboard, typing commands as soon as they are connected, need no further action at all, and are not stopped by controls that block storage devices only. Either way, the attacker's code runs on the workstation with the user's privileges, giving the same foothold as a successful phishing payload: access to the user's data and a route into the internal network.
Removable media also offers a way to take data out of the organisation and to reach systems that are not connected to the internet. The attacker must deliver a physical device and depends on someone connecting it, which limits the rating. The finding shows that devices of unknown origin can be connected and used, and that endpoint controls did not stop their content running; it reflects the device control, application control and awareness measures in place, not the individuals who connected the devices.
Remediation
Control which devices can be used, stop their content from running, and tell staff what to do with found devices:
- Restrict removable storage with device control, for example Microsoft Defender for Endpoint device control or the Group Policy settings under System > Removable Storage Access, allowing only approved, encrypted devices where there is a business need.
- Enforce application control, and enable the attack surface reduction rule that blocks untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB.
- Turn off AutoPlay for all drives through Group Policy.
- Consider device installation restrictions that block new keyboard-class devices on sensitive systems, accepting the support impact, and monitor for new devices being installed.
- Tell staff to hand found devices to the IT or security team unopened, and include removable media in awareness training.
Confirm improvement by checking that an unapproved device is blocked on a sample of workstations, and through a repeat exercise.
References
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