Weak WPA2 Pre-Shared Key
A WPA2-Personal network uses a guessable pre-shared key, which can be cracked offline from a captured handshake or PMKID to gain access to the network.
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Open in the calculator |
| CVSS 4.0 | 8.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator |
| CWE | CWE-521: Weak Password Requirements |
| OWASP Top 10 | A07:2025 Authentication Failures |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1110.002 Password Cracking, T1669 Wi-Fi Networks, T1040 Network Sniffing |
| Category | Cryptographic Failures |
Description
A wireless network protected with WPA2-Personal uses a pre-shared key (PSK) that is weak enough to be guessed: for example a dictionary word, the organisation's name with a year or number, an address, a default key printed on the device, or a short key. Every user and device shares the same key, it often stays unchanged for years, and staff who leave continue to know it.
WPA2-Personal lets an attacker test guesses offline, without interacting with the network after the initial capture. The attacker records the four-way handshake when a client connects, and can force a client to reconnect by sending spoofed deauthentication frames where protected management frames are not enforced. Many access points also include a value called the PMKID in the first handshake message, which an attacker can obtain directly from the access point with no client present. Either capture can be attacked with tools such as hashcat, which tests guesses at high speed on ordinary graphics hardware, so a key built from words, names, dates or common patterns is likely to be recovered from wordlists and rules within hours or less.
With the key, an attacker in range, including outside the premises where the signal reaches, can join the network as if they were an authorised device and reach every system the network can reach. Because WPA2-Personal does not provide forward secrecy, the key also lets them decrypt the traffic of other clients whose handshakes they capture, including traffic recorded before the key was cracked, and the access lasts until the key is changed on every device. The finding is confirmed when the key is recovered from a captured handshake or PMKID during testing.
Remediation
Replace the weak key and reduce dependence on a single shared secret:
- For networks used by staff or corporate devices, move to WPA2-Enterprise or WPA3-Enterprise with 802.1X, so each user or device authenticates with its own credentials or certificate and access can be revoked individually.
- Where a pre-shared key must remain, enable WPA3-Personal (SAE), which resists offline guessing from captured exchanges and gives each session its own keys. In WPA2/WPA3 transition mode, clients that still connect with WPA2 remain open to the offline attack, so the key must be strong regardless.
- Set a long, randomly generated key, for example of 20 or more random characters, held in a password manager, rather than one derived from words, names or dates.
- Change the key whenever staff who know it leave. Vendor features that issue a separate pre-shared key per device or per user allow individual keys to be revoked without reconfiguring every device.
- Restrict what the network can reach, so that a recovered key gives as little access as possible.
Confirm the fix by repeating the handshake or PMKID capture and confirming that the new key resists the same wordlist and rule-based attack, or that the network now uses SAE or 802.1X.
References
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