WPA2-Enterprise Clients Do Not Validate the Server Certificate

Wireless clients do not check the RADIUS server's certificate, so a rogue access point can impersonate the corporate network and capture users' domain credentials.

SeverityHigh
CVSS 3.18.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.08.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation
OWASP Top 10A07:2025 Authentication Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1557.004 Evil Twin, T1110.002 Password Cracking, T1669 Wi-Fi Networks
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

The corporate wireless network uses WPA2-Enterprise or WPA3-Enterprise with a password-based EAP method, typically PEAP with MSCHAPv2 or EAP-TTLS, but some or all clients do not validate the certificate that the RADIUS server presents. These methods protect the user's credentials inside a TLS tunnel, and the tunnel is only as trustworthy as the client's check that the server certificate was issued by the expected certification authority to the expected server name. Where that check is missing, the client completes the tunnel with any server. Typical causes are profiles configured by hand on personal devices, Windows profiles with server validation turned off, older Android settings that allowed a choice not to validate, and profiles that ask users whether to trust an unknown certificate, which many users accept.

The weakness is exploited with an evil twin: an access point broadcasting the corporate network name, backed by the attacker's own RADIUS server, using tools such as hostapd-mana or EAPHammer. It needs no prior access, only a position within range of an affected device, which may be in a car park, a station or a hotel used by staff. Clients that roam to it, attracted by a stronger signal or pushed off the genuine network with deauthentication frames, send the user's MSCHAPv2 challenge and response for offline cracking: responses for weak or common passwords are cracked quickly, and the protocol's design allows the account's NT hash to be recovered with significant computing effort whatever the password's strength. Some clients can be negotiated down to methods such as EAP-GTC that reveal the password in cleartext.

The domain credentials captured this way give access to the corporate wireless network and to every other service that accepts the account, such as email, VPN and remote desktop, unless multi-factor authentication or certificate-based access prevents it. The weakness is confirmed by running a test access point with an untrusted certificate and observing which clients complete authentication against it.

Remediation

Make every client verify the RADIUS server before sending credentials:

  • Deploy wireless profiles centrally, through Group Policy for domain-joined Windows devices and through mobile device management, such as Microsoft Intune, for laptops, phones and tablets, rather than letting users configure them.
  • In each profile, enable server certificate validation, specify the certification authority that issued the RADIUS server certificate (preferably an internal CA used for this purpose), and specify the exact server names the certificate must contain.
  • Disable the option that lets users trust new servers or certification authorities when prompted, so that a rogue server causes the connection to fail rather than a prompt.
  • Move to EAP-TLS, where each device authenticates with its own certificate, so that there is no password for a rogue access point to capture. Where passwords remain, require multi-factor authentication on remote services that accept the same accounts.
  • Keep unmanaged devices off the corporate network and give them a separate guest network.

As an interim measure, enable wireless intrusion detection to alert on access points broadcasting the corporate network name. Confirm the fix by repeating the rogue access point test and confirming that no client completes authentication.

References


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