WPA or TKIP Encryption in Use

A wireless network allows the original WPA protocol or its TKIP cipher, which is deprecated and allows limited decryption and forging of frames.

SeverityMedium
CVSS 3.14.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Open in the calculator
CVSS 4.02.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Open in the calculator
CWECWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
OWASP Top 10A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures
MITRE ATT&CKT1040 Network Sniffing, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
CategoryCryptographic Failures

Description

One or more wireless networks offer the original version of WPA, or allow the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) as a cipher, either on its own or alongside AES-CCMP in a mixed WPA/WPA2 configuration. TKIP was designed as a temporary fix that could run on hardware built for WEP. It still uses the RC4 stream cipher, and relies on a weak message integrity check called Michael, backed by countermeasures that shut the network down briefly when repeated integrity failures are detected.

Published attacks, starting with the Beck-Tews attack and refined since, allow an attacker within range to decrypt short frames such as ARP packets, recover the Michael key for one direction of traffic, and then inject a limited number of forged frames, which can be used to redirect or disrupt traffic, for example by poisoning ARP caches. The attacks are slow and constrained, and do not recover the pre-shared key or give network access on their own, which limits the impact, but they show that TKIP no longer provides the protection it was designed for. TKIP has been deprecated in the IEEE 802.11 standard and is not used by WPA3, and keeping it enabled also holds the network back from WPA3.

In a mixed configuration, the group cipher used for broadcast and multicast traffic is TKIP, so even clients that use AES-CCMP for their own traffic depend on it. Keeping TKIP enabled usually indicates legacy clients, whose other security settings deserve review, and clients using TKIP are limited to legacy data rates, because the high-throughput rates of 802.11n and later are not permitted with it. The configuration is identified from beacon frames during a wireless survey, where tools such as airodump-ng report the cipher as TKIP, or as CCMP and TKIP.

Remediation

Remove WPA and TKIP from every SSID:

  • Configure each network for WPA3 where clients support it, or WPA2 with AES-CCMP as the only cipher. WPA2/WPA3 transition mode allows a gradual move while still excluding TKIP.
  • Before disabling TKIP, identify the clients that negotiate it from the wireless controller's client list, then update their drivers or firmware, reconfigure them for AES-CCMP, or replace them.
  • Where a legacy device can only use TKIP, give it a dedicated SSID and network segment with firewall rules that allow only the traffic it needs, and plan its replacement.

Confirm the fix with a wireless survey showing that no SSID advertises WPA or the TKIP cipher, and that clients still connect using AES-CCMP.

References


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